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Abstract
The paper studies the e⁄ect of resource abundance on human devel-
opment. A simple theory is presented to show that resource abundance
negatively a⁄ects human development through its e⁄ect on inequality. The
prediction of the theory is then tested using a system of three equations.
Estimates indicate that the transmission channel through inequality is sta-
tistically signi￿cant and economically relevant even after controlling for
per-capita income, institutional quality, and other determinants of both
human development and inequality.
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11 Introduction
This paper documents the adverse e⁄ect that resource abundance has on human
development through the dynamics of income inequality. In a simple theoretical
model, capitalists allocate their wealth between resource-seeking and physical
capital investment. A resource boom implies that less wealth is allocated to in-
vestment. This in turn reduces the marginal productivity of labour and drives
the wage of workers in the productive sector down, while the rents of capi-
talists increase. Growing inequalities between capitalists and workers have an
ambiguous e⁄ect on average per-capita income in the economy. However, a
mean-preserving increase in income inequality unambiguously worsens human
development, which is formally de￿ned as a concave function of individual in-
come. The econometric analysis tests the predictions of the theoretical model
within the framework of a system of three equations. Estimates suggest that (i)
resource abundance increases inequality after controlling for per-capita income,
(ii) higher inequality reduces the average level of human development in the
population, and (iii) resource abundance worsens institutional quality, but the
e⁄ect of institutional quality on human development is not always signi￿cant
once per-capita income and income inequality are controlled for.
The conventional wisdom holds that resource abundance is bad for economic
growth. Gylfason et al. (1999), Gylfason (2001a) and Sachs and Warner (1999
and 2001) document a statistically signi￿cant inverse relationship between the
size of the resource sector and economic growth in large cross-sections of coun-
tries. Work by Leite and Weidmann (1999), Ross (2001), Sala-i-Martin and
Subramanian (2003), Isham et al. (2005) indicates that a large natural resource
sector lowers the quality of governance and weakens state￿ s capacity to deliver
dynamically e¢ cient policies. This negative institutional e⁄ect then results in
slower growth.
Recent research provides some interesting challanges to the conventional
wisdom. Stijns (2005), Gylfason and Zoega (2006), Brunnschweiler (2008),
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), and Alexeev and Conrad (2009) emphasize
that empirical results are sensitive to the way in which natural resources are
measured. Earlier papers typically employed the GDP share of the primary
commodity sector and/or the total exports share of primary commodity exports
as empirical proxies for resource abundance. However, these are indicators of
resource dependence, rather than abundance, and they are likely to be endoge-
nous with the dependent variable in income or growth regressions. When more
speci￿c measures of resource abundance, based on the estimated stock of nat-
ural capital and mineral assets per individual (see below for further discussion),
are used, then results are reversed and resources are found to be positive for
growth and, possibly, for institutional development as well.
A related strand of research argues that resources are not good or bad per se,
but that their e⁄ects depend on some underlying structural conditions. In this
sense, the ￿ndings reported by Gylfason (2001b), Mehlum et al. (2006), and
Snyder (2006) suggest that what seems to matter for economic growth is the
quality of resource management and of economic management and institutions
2in general. Hodler (2006) develops a theoretical model where resources are a
curse only in ethnically fractionalised countries, while they are a blessing in
homogenous countries. He then provides empirical evidence in support of this
theoretical prediction. Collier and Hoe› er (2009) ￿nd that democratization of
resource-rich countries can reduce growth unless the democratic process involves
stronger checks and balances in policymaking. Finally, in Bhattacharyya and
Hodler (2010) the e⁄ect of resource abundance on the quality of governance (i.e.
the level of corruption) is conditional on the strength of democratic institutions.
While there is a voluminous literature on the growth and institutional e⁄ects
of natural resources, only a few papers look at the impact of resource abundance
on other aspects of the development process. Bulte et al. (2005) study the e⁄ect
of resource intensity on di⁄erent measures of human welfare. They conclude that
any signi￿cant e⁄ect operates indirectly through institutional quality. Costan-
tini and Monni (2008) analyse the interrelations between growth, institutional
quality, human development, and resource . They ￿nd that more abundant nat-
ural resource endowments cause worse development outcomes by lowering the
growth rate of the economy and by worsening the average quality of institutions.
Gylfason (2008) discusses crowding out e⁄ects between natural capital and so-
cial capital, thus providing evidence of an adverse e⁄ect of natural resources on
social development.
The purpose of this paper is to better understand the e⁄ects of natural re-
sources on human development, whereby human development is de￿ned by a
combination of di⁄erent social outcomes. This seems to be an important issue
in view of the growing interest of the international community towards non-
income dimensions of development. Given the state of the art in the literature,
the analysis will investigate whether or not natural resources a⁄ect development
beyond any e⁄ect they might have on per-capita income and institutional qual-
ity. In so doing, the paper considers a channel of transmission that previous
literature has neglected: income inequality. In fact, the idea that natural re-
sources cause inequality is not new (see Gylfason and Zoega, 2003). What is
new is the theoretical and empirical investigation of how this inequality e⁄ect
matters for human development. In other words, the paper argues, and demon-
strates, that even if resources did not adversely a⁄ect per-capita income and
institutional quality, their e⁄ect on inequality would still produce what can be
regarded as a development curse.1
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
theoretical argument. Section 3 introduces the empirical analysis, with speci-
￿ca attention to the issue of measuring resource abundance and instrumenting
endogenous variables. Results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The appendix contains some proofs, statistical diagnostics, and the description
of variables and data sources.
1The medical literature on the e⁄ects of income inequality on population helath is also
relevant to the topic of this paper. Wilkinson and Pickett (2006) conduct a meta-analysis
of published work and conclude that, while the issue is still controversial, about 70% of the
papers they surveyed suggest that health is less good in societies where income di⁄erences are
bigger.
32 A simple theory
To provide some theoretical fundations to the econometric analysis, a simple
two-sector model is presented in this section.
2.1 The economy
The economy consists of two sectors: natural reosurce and ￿nal good. In the nat-
ural resource sector, individuals make an initial investment and employ some
search technology in order to appropriate (i.e. discover) new bundles of re-
sources. Let r be the value of the resources discovered by a generic individual
and s her initial investment. Then r ￿s is the resource rent and it is expressed
as follows:
r ￿ s = ￿f(s) (1)
where ￿ ￿ 0 and f0(s) > 0 and f00(s) < 0
The intution underlying (1) is that discovering new bundles is a stochastic
process (very much in line with the formalization of Gylfason and Zoega, 2003).
How many bundles, and of which value, are discovered will depend on (i) the
initial investment in the search process, (ii) the producitivity of the search tech-
nology, and (iii) country￿ s endowment of natural resources. The e⁄ect of initial
investment and search technology are captured by the term f(s). The assump-
tions concerning the sign of the ￿rst and second derivative of the f function
imply that investment in the resource sector is characterized by diminishing
marginal products. The parameter ￿ instead captures the e⁄ect of country￿ s
endowment. Intuitively, if a country has no resources to start with, or if its
resources have no market value, so that ￿ = 0, then an individual can invest all
of her wealth and emply the best possible search technology and still her rent
will be zero simply because there are no resources to discover and appropriate.
Conversely, if the country is well endowed with valuable natural resources, and
hence ￿ is large, then the number of bundles discovered for any given investment
and technology is higher and the rent will also be higher.
In the ￿nal good sector, a large number of perfectly competitive ￿rms pro-
duce a homogenous good that can be consumed or invested. The production





where Y denotes ￿rm￿ s output, L and K are ￿rm￿ s inputs of labour and
capital, A is the aggregate stock of ideas, and 0 < ￿ < 1:
Following Romer (1986), learning-by-doing and perfect knowledge spillovers
imply that A =
P
i Ki = K . The aggregate production function is then
obtained by aggregating equation (2) over all is:
4Y = KL1￿￿ (3)
where Y =
P
i Yi and L =
P
i Li . In the absence of population growth,
equation (3) belongs with the class of AK production functions.
The eocnomy is populated by individuals of two types: capitalists (P) and
workers (W). There are no demographic dynamics, meaning that the number of
both capitalists and workers is constant and the ratio of capitalists to workers
is equal to v, with v < 1. The generic individual in each group lives for two
periods. In the ￿rst period she earns an income a, either by working or by
investing. In the second period she spends all of her income to consume the
homogenous good produced by the competitive ￿rms. Through consumption,
the individual achieves a given level of human development h. The relationship
between human development and consumption is given by:
hj = c￿
j (4)
where hj denotes the level of human development of an individual of type j
(j = P;W), cj is consumption of the individual of type j, and 0 < ￿ < 1.
To simplify the discussion, it will be assumed that one unit of the income
earned in period 1 buys one unit of consumption in period 2, so that in the end
human development in the second period is a concave function of the income
earned in the ￿rst period. The objective of the individuals is therefore to max-
imise ￿rst period earnings as this will imply the highest possible level of human
development in the second period.
The representative capitalist is initially endowed with one divisible unit of
wealth. This unit of wealth can be invested in the discovery of new resources or
rented to ￿rms as physical capital. The representative worker is endowed with
one unit of labour that she inelastically supplies to the perfectly competitive
￿rms in the ￿nal good sector. If workers cannot borrow against their future
labour income, then they cannot a⁄ord the initial investment in the natural
resource sector. Therefore, only capitalists populate the natural resource sector.
2.2 Allocative choices and equilibrium
This subsection studies the equilibrium choices of the representative individuals
and how these choices are a⁄ected by changes in country￿ s resource endowment
￿: The function f(s) in equation (1) is assumed to take the form s￿, with
0 < ￿ < 1. The resource rent earned by the capitalist is therefore:
r ￿ s = ￿s￿ (5)
It is worth stressing that s represents the proportion of initial wealth that
the capitalists allocates to the discovery of natural resources. Therefore, s < 1
and s￿ is decreasing in ￿:2 In this sense, lower values of ￿ denote a more e¢ cient
2The margina product of s is instead a non-linear function of ￿ and has a maximum at
￿ = ￿ 1
ln(s)
5technology; that is, a technology that allows to earn higher rents for any given
s and ￿.
Letting ￿ denote the rental price of physical capital, the maximization prob-
lem of the representative capitalist is :
max
s aP = (r ￿ s) + ￿(1 ￿ s) (6)
subject to (5) and to the ￿rst order condition for the maximization of ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t ￿ = L1￿￿ .
For 0 < ￿ <
￿








Equation (7) then implies that the income earned by the representative cap-









(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ (8)
Equation (7) suggests that the proportion of wealth allocated by the capi-
talist to the resource sector is higher the more resource abundant the country








positive, meaning that the capitalist earns a higher income the more resource
abundant the country is. It is also worth stressing the that capitalist￿ s income
in equilibrium declines as ￿ grows; that is, a less e¢ cient search technology
reduces the earnings of the capitalist for any given level of country￿ s resource
abundance.
The representative worker does not have much of a choice in this model. She
can only supply her unit of labour to ￿rms in the ￿nal good sector and earn a
the market clearing wage. Her income in the ￿rst period is therefore:
aW = K(1 ￿ ￿)L￿￿ (9)
The stock of physical capital K is determined by the allocative decision of











Given that L is equal to the number of workers and that the ratio of capi-
talists to workers is assumed to be constant and equal to ￿, then N=L = v and
equation (10) can substituted into equation (9) to obtain:
3For ￿ >
￿
￿ pro￿t maximization yields the corner solution s = 1. For ￿ < 0, the corner
solution would be s = 0.









Equation (11) has a very intuitive meaning: workers earn a lower income in
resource-richer countries. This is because of the crowding-out e⁄ect between the
natural resource sector and the ￿nal good sector. In resource-richer economies,
the capitalist invests more of her initial wealth in searching for new bundles,
thus leaving less wealth available for investment in physical capital. In turn,
a lower level of physical capital reduces the marginal producitivity of labour










With ￿ = L1￿￿, comparison between equation (8) and equation (11) imme-
diately reveals that aP is always larger than aW and that the gap between the
income of the two representative individuals widens as ￿ grows. This is obvious
since the derivatives @aP
@￿ and @aW
@￿ are of opposite sign. Under the assumption
that the relative size of the two groups of workers is constant, both the standard
deviation of per-capita incomes around the mean and the Gini coe¢ cient are
proportional to the gap between aP and aW:This implies that income inequality




h, and average income,
_
a, are formally equal to:
_
h = v (aP)
￿ + (1 ￿ v)(aW)
￿ (12)
_
a = vaP + (1 ￿ v)aW (13)

















Proposition 2 The likelihood of @
_
h
@￿ being negative is higher the wider the
gap between aP and aW.
Proof. See Appendix.
These two simple propositions summarize the theoretical e⁄ect of country￿ s
resource abundance on average human development and average income. Of
particular interest for empirical purposes is proposition 1. This proposition
implies that an increase in ￿ that leaves
_
a unchanged unambigously reduces
_
h.
That is, holding per-capita income constant, higher resource abundance reduces
average human development by raising income inequality in the economy. The
7intuition underlying this result is that as natural resources crowd out the ￿nal
good sector, capitalists receive a higher income and therefore improve their
human development while the opposite happens with workers. However, because
of the concavity in the relationship between human development and income,
the increase in human development of the capitalits is relatively weaker than the
decrease in human development of the workers. Average human development is
therefore reduced for any increase in resource abundance that preserves mean
income. In fact, proposition 2 suggests that even without holding mean income
constant, a wider gap between income of capitalists and income of workers
is likely to determine an overall decrease in average human development in
response to an increase in resource abundance.
3 Empirical model and data
3.1 Speci￿cation and estimation method
The prediction of the theoretical model is that resource abundance lowers human
development, after controlling for the level of per-capita income, through its
e⁄ect on the inequality of income distribution in the economy. The empirical
test of this prediction involves the estimation of two structural relations:
Inequalityc;t = ￿0 + ￿1natural_resourcesc;t + HZc;t + "c;t (14)
Human_devolpmentc;t = ￿0 + ￿1Inequalityc;t + KWc;t + ￿it (15)
where Z and W are vectors of controls, c denotes a generic country, t is
time, " and ￿ are error terms, and ￿s, ￿s, H, and K are the parameters to be
estimated.
Equation (14) captures the inequality e⁄ect of resource abundance while
equation (15) accounts for the transmission channel of the e⁄ect of natural
resources on human development through the dynamics of inequality. Based on
the theoretical model, the expectation is that ￿1 > 0 and ￿1 > 0.
In order to allow for possible correlation in the residuals across equations,
and hence achieve some gain in e¢ ciency, the two equations should be esti-
mated together as a system. However, system estimation is not immune from
shortcomings. In particular, if one of the equations were misspeci￿ed, then the
estimates of the other equation would be a⁄ected too. The practical solution to
this stalmate is to estimate ￿rst the two equations individually, using standard
two stage least squares (2SLS) to account for the possible endogeneity of some
of the regressors. Then, the equations are jointly estimated as a system using a
GMM estimator. System and single equation estimates can thus be compared
in order to detect any signi￿cant di⁄erences in the results.4
4See Wooldrdige (2002) for a discussion of the GMM estimator. It is worth stressing
that the more traditional three stage least squares estimator (3SLS) is a special case of the
GMM estimator. As further discussed below, system estimates obtained with 3SLS are not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from those obtained with the GMM estimator.
83.2 Choice of variables
Income inequality is measured by the Gini index. Resource abundance is mea-
sured by the log of subsoil assets in US$ per capita, using data provided by
World Bank (1997). This choice is in line with the most recent literature (see
for instance Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008 and Alexeev and Conrad, 2009) and
addresses some of the shortcomings associated with the traditional approach of
measuring dependence as the GDP or total exports share of primary commod-
ity exports (see Sachs and Warner, 1999 and 2001). Subsoil wealth rather than
total natural capital (which would include land, forests, and timber resources in
additional to subsoil assets) is used because it appears to be closer to the notion
of resource abundance portrayed in the theoretical model. In fact, one should
note that the correlation between subsoil assets and total natural capital is high
(0.55) and statistically signi￿cant at the 1% con￿dence level.5
The main limitation of the subsoil assets data is that they are not available on
a time-series dimension and therefore, in a panel regression, they work as time-
invariant country-speci￿c e⁄ect. For this reason, other recent papers (i.e. Collier
and Hoe› er, 2008 and Bhattacharyya and Holder, 2010) employ the adjusted
net savings dataset described by Hamilton and Clemens (1999) and available
through the World Bank Development Indicators. Once again, correlations
between these data and subsoil assets data are very high (around 0.4) and
signi￿cant. All of the regressions reported in the next subsection have been re-
estimated using the adjust net savings dataset and results appear to be robust.
The empirical measurement of human development is also a controversial
issue. Previous literature makes use of several dissagregate indicators of social
outcomes (i.e. child mortatlity rate, primary or secondary enrollment rate, life
expectancy, etc...). However, if one is interested in the joint evolution of di⁄er-
ent development dimensions, then some sort of aggregate measure ought to be
employed. Constantini and Monni (2008) for instance use the Human Devel-
opment Index (HDI) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP,
1990), which however is obtained from an arbitrary choice of weights in the
aggregation of the individual components.
In this paper, human development is de￿ned as the ￿rst princinpal compo-
nent of life expectancy at birth, rate of children immunization against diphteria,
pertussis, and tetanus, and averge years of education in the population. While
principal components guarantees that weights are not chosen ad-hoc, one has
to recognize that the selection of the individual components to be included in
the aggregate measure is still arbitrary and therefore open to criticism. In de-
fense of this choice it can be said that (i) adding more individual components
does not seem to change the dynamics of the aggregate measure by much and
(ii) data on life expectancy, immunization rates, and schooling are available for
5World Bank (2005) reports other natural capital data that could be used to proxy for
resource abundance. The correlation between the 1997 and 2005 data is very high. For
subsoil assets, the correlation coe¢ cient is 0.95 and for total natural capital it is 0.86. Not
surprisingly, estimates obtained using the 2005 data are qualitatively identical to estimates
obtained from the 1997 data.
9most countries over su¢ ciently long time-series (the same is not necessarily true
for other measures of human development).
The vector of controls H includes: the log of per-capita GDP, a measure
of institutional quality, and a measure of ethnic fragmentation. The role of
per-capita income and institutional quality in determining income inequality is
discussed in Carmignani (2009). Istitutional quality is measured by one minus
the ratio of currency in circulation to M2 (see Clague et al. 1999 and Dollar and
Kraay, 2004). This variable measures the extent to which property rights are
su¢ ciently secure that individuals are willing to hold liquid assets via ￿nancial
intermediaires. It has at least two relevant advantages over other measures of
institutional quality: (i) it is objective and (ii) it is available on an annual basis
for many countries.6 Ethnic fragmentation is likely to matter because it a⁄ects
public goods provision and redistribution (see for instance Alesina et al. 1999
and 2000).
The vector K includes log per-capita income and institutional quality, in line
with Bulte et al. (2005). In addition, two country-￿xed e⁄ects are controlled for:
distance from the equator and settler￿ s mortality rate. Distance from the equator
is intended as a rough proxy for the incidence of fatal diseases such as malaria
and yellow fever. The inclusion of the settler￿ s mortality rate as a regressor
instead follows the argument put forward by Glaeser et al. 2004. They suggest
that what European settlers brought to colonies was not just a new institutional
setting, but also human capital. They then show that the correlation between
educational outcomes and settler￿ s mortality is in fact generally high. Therefore,
settler￿ s mortality is likely to be a relevant determinant of human development,
when this latter is broadly de￿ned to include health and education.
3.3 Choice of instruments
A key problem in estimating equations (14) and (15) is that some of the regres-
sors might be endogenous to the dependent variables and therefore need to be
instrumented. While subsoil assets is likely to be an exogenous variable (see
Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008), per-capita income and institutional quality
might be a⁄ected by inequality and/or human development. To identify ap-
propriate instruments, one shuld then look at the literature on the long-term
determinants of income and institutional quality and see which variables are
generally used as controls.7 One such variables is distance from the equator.
However, this can be used as an excluded instrument only in equation (14) as
it is already included as a regressor in equation (15). Settler￿ s mortality is a
popular instrument for institutional quality, but again it appears as a regressor
in equation (15) and therefore it can work as an excluded instrument only in
6Regressions were also estimated using an alternative de￿nition of institutional quality:
the index of quality of the legal system of Economic Freedom of the World (see Gwartney and
Lawson, 2009). Results do not change to any signi￿cant extent.
7Determinants of institutions and income are often studied together, see for instance Ace-
mogu et al. 2001 and Glaeser et al. 2004. Other well known studies of the determinants of
income include Nunn, 2008 and Alexeev and Conrad, 2009. On the determinants of institu-
tional quality see the seminal paper by La Porta et al. 1999.
10equation (14). Other excluded instruments to be used in both equations would
be desirable in order to increase the number of overidentfying restrictions. Re-
gional dummies and dummies for legal origin can serve this purpose. Indeed,
regional e⁄ects are often found to be relevant in explaining long-term di⁄erences
in income levels across countries. Regional dummies might therefore instrument
for per-capita GDP. Legal origins are instead identifed as key determinants of
institutional quality. Dummy variables for English, Scandinavian, German, and
Socialist legal origins are therefore used as instruments for institutional quality.
Furthermore, when the equations are not estimated as a system, the likely
endogeneity of inequality and human development in equation (15) should also
be addressed through the choice of an instrument for inequality. In fact, the
speci￿cation of equation (14) immediately suggests using ethnic fragmentation
as an instrument for inequality.
All of these instruments are time-invariant and should therefore be predeter-
mined relative to income and institutional quality. The J-test con￿rms that the
overindifying restrictions implied by the choice of instruments are valid. Mea-
sures of goodness of ￿t of the ￿rst stage regression in the 2SLS also indicate
that the chosen instruments are likely to be relevant.8
4 Results
The equations are estimated on data for 65 countries for the period 1980-2005.
Data are averaged over sub-periods of ￿ve year so that at most ￿ve observations
per country are available. This implies a total of 325 potential observations. In
fact, due to missing data, the panel is unbalanced and the e⁄ective number of
observations available for estimation is considerably smaller than the potential.
Table 1 reports 2SLS estimates of equations (14) and (15). Starting with
equation (14), the coe¢ cients in column I indicate that resource abundance
increases inequality after controlling for the e⁄ect of per-capita GDP. The
inequality-reducing e⁄ect of institutional quality is in line with previous research
(see Carmignani, 2009) while the negative coe¢ cient of ethnic fragmentation is
in line with the "disguised" redistributive policy hypothesis of Alesina et al.
2000. The lack of signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient of per-capita GDP might be due
to multicollinearity between per-capita GDP and institutional quality.
As discussed in the previous section, several di⁄erent measures of resource
abundance have been used in the literature. When resource dependence is mea-
sured by the total natural capital or resource rents measured from the adjusted
saving datasets, estimated coe¢ cients are virtually equal to those reported in
column I. Some changes are instead observed when a measure of resource de-
pendence (exports of fuels and metals in percent of total merchandise export)
replaces the measure of resource abundance. Estimated coe¢ cients in column
II show that in this case resources appear to play no role in determining in-
8The J-statistic is reported at the bottom of the tables in the next section. The associated
p-value is always larger than 0.1, suggesting that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at
usual con￿dence levels. The ￿rst stage diagnostics are instead provided in the Appendix.
11equality. However, the resource dependence measure is likely to be endogenous
with income inequality.9 Following Brunnschweiler (2008), resource dependence
is instrumented by two indicators of constitutional arrangements: the type of
regime (i.e. presidential, parliamentary, or assembly elected) and the type of
electoral rule (proportional vs. majoritarian). The regression with resource
dependence treated as an endogenous variable are shown in column III. The
inequality-increasing e⁄ect of natural resources returns to be signi￿cant, but
the coe¢ cient of institutional quality is no longer di⁄erent from zero.
Turning to equation (15), estimates in column IV indicate that higher in-
equality worsens human development. Combined with the result that resource
abundance increases inequality, this ￿nding provide support to the theoretical
prediction: resource abundance negatively a⁄ects human development through
its e⁄ect on income inequality. Interestingly, estimates also suggest that af-
ter controlling for the level of per-capita income, institutional quality does not
determine human development. This ￿nding however changes when the two
equations are estimated as a system (see below). Looking at the other controls,
settler￿ s mortality is largely insigni￿cant while distance from the equator ap-
pears to reduce human development. This latter result is counter-intuitive and
might be due to the fact that latitude is a poor proxy the incidence of diseases.
The speci￿cation presented in column V accounts for the possibility that
there is a residual direct e⁄ect of resource abundance on human development
after controlling for inequality, institutions, and per-capita income. The esti-
mated coe¢ cient of the natural resource variable suggests that this residul e⁄ect
is signi￿cant and has the same sign as the indirect e⁄ect operating through in-
equality. The mechanics of this residual e⁄ect should be investigated in future
work.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
System estimates are reported in table 2. In general, it appears that esti-
mates are more precise. This gain in e¢ ciency results from the fact that the
system estimator allows for non-zero correlations between the error terms of the
two equations. The core of the ￿ndings is con￿rmed. In column I, resource
abundance is still a signi￿cant determinant of inequality. In column II, higher
inequality reduces human development and there is again evidence of a signif-
icant direct e⁄ect of resource abundance. There is however an important new
￿nding: the coe¢ cient of institutional quality is now signi￿cant, even if only
at the 10% con￿dence level. Therefore, there is evidence of a positive e⁄ect of
good institutions on human development.
The last three columns of table 2 report estimates from an extended system
of equation. In addition to equations (14) and (15), the system now includes an
equation for the determinantion of institutional quality:
9The p-value associated with the J-statistic in column II is actually 0.11. Therefore, the
null hypothesis that the overidenfying restrictions are valid can still be rejected, but at a
rather low con￿dence level.
12Institutional_qualityc;t = $0 + $1natural_resourcesc;t + ￿Sc;t + ￿c;t (16)
where S is a vector of controls, ￿ is the error term, and $s and ￿ are the
parameters to be estimated.
With equation (16), the empirical model integrates two channels of transmis-
sion from resource abundance to human development: the inequality channel
theorized in this paper and the institutional channel studied by Bulte et al.
(2005) and Costantini and Monni (2008). The choice of controls for equation
(16) draws on La Porta et al. (1999), but with a major modi￿cation: the
inclusion of the settler￿ s mortality rate (in line with Acemoglu et al. 2001).
The estimated coe¢ cients of equations (14) and (15) are qualitatively the same
as those reported in column II and III. Therefore the key ￿ndings concern-
ing the role of resource abundance and the transmission via income inequality
survive. The coe¢ cients reported in column V however indicate that resource
abundance worsens institutional quality and therefore a⁄ects human develop-
ment also through this negative institutional e⁄ect. In other words, the e⁄ect
through inequality does not eliminate the e⁄ect through inequality that has been
identi￿ed by Bulte et al. (2005). The two e⁄ects operate together and in the
same direction: higher resource abundance results in lower human development.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
5 Conclusion
The paper uses a simple theoretical framework to investigate the e⁄ect of re-
source abundance on human development. The theory predicts that higher
resource abundance worsens average human development through its e⁄ect on
the inequality of income distribution in the economy. This prediction is then
empirically tested using a system of three equations. Estimates indicate that
resource-rich countries do tend to experience higher inequality and that higher
inequality reduces human development. This e⁄ect via inequality adds to the
e⁄ect that natural resources have on human development through the quality
of institutions. Therefore, the inequality channel and the institutional channel
co-exist and operate in the same direction. However, estimates also suggest that
a third channel of transmission is at work. An hypothesis to be tested in future
work is that this third channel operates through the volatility of growth. In
a nutshell, resource-rich economies would experience greater volatility because
they are exposed to changes in international commodity prices. If volatility has
asymmetric e⁄ects; that is, if recession hurt the poor more than the rich and
expansions bene￿t the rich more than the poor, then higher volatility would
reduce human development.
From a policymaking perspective, the results of this paper assign a critical
role to redistribution in bu⁄ering the adverse e⁄ects of resource abundance on
development prospect. Of course, redistribution is not meant to substitute for
13institutional reforms, which are desirable not just to avoid the resource curse,
but also to promote growth and improve economic outcomes. However, tackling
the inequalities associated with resource abundance will help transform the curse
into a potential blessing.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of proposition 1
From equation (12) the derivative of
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From equation (13) the derivative of
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To be mean-preserving, a chance in ￿ must be such that @
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In equation (20), ￿ is positive and 1 ￿ v. As shown in the text, @aW
@￿ is
negative and aP > aW. This latter inequality implies that the term in square
brackets is positive, so that in the end @
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6.2 Proof of proposition 2

























where is use made of the fact that in equilibrium ￿ = L1￿￿












































The sign of both derivatives is uncertain and depends on the relative size of







so that the sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of the expression
in square brackets. While this expression cannot be signed unambiguously, an
increase in aP and a contemporaneous decrease in aW (that is, a wider gap





6.3 First stage diagnostics
To be valid, instruments must be exogenous and relevant. The J-test reported
at the bottom of tables 1 and 2 indicates that the overidentfying restrictions
implied by the choice of instruments cannot be rejected, thus providing some
evidence that the instruments are likely to be exogenous. To assess relevance,
instead, various measures of goodness of ￿t of the ￿rst stage regression in the
2SLS procedure are reported in Table 3. For each endogenous regressor, the ta-
ble gives the R2, partial R2 and associated F￿statistic, and the Shea (partial)
R2. The traditional R2 is not particularly informative in this context. More
interesting are the other two R2; which are computed by partialling out included
instruments. In particular, the Shea￿ s R2 takes into account interrelations be-
tween excluded instruments when there are two or more endogenous variables.
As can be seen from the table, the F-test associated with the partial R2 always
rejects the null hypothesis that the excluded instrument are not signi￿cant in
the ￿rst stage regression. At the same time, Shea R2 is numerically very close
to the partial R2. As discussed for instance in Baum et al. (2003) this suggests
that the chosen instruments are e⁄ectively relavant.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
156.4 List of variables and data sources
￿ Human development: principal component of (i) life expectancy at birth,
(ii) percentage of children ages 12-23 months who recieved vaccination
against diphteria, pertussis, and tetanus, (iii) average number of years of
schooling in the population. Source: life expectancy and immunization
data are taken from the World Development Indicators, education data
are from Barro and Lee (2001) and updates from ILo and UNESCO.
￿ Inequality: Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution. Source: United Nations
University - WIDER database.
￿ Per-capita GDP: log or GDP per-capita in constant US dollars. Source:
World Development Indicators
￿ Natural resources: the main reference variable is the log of subsoil assets
per-individual in US dollars from World Bank (1997). The following other
variables are used in some regressions: log of natural capital per-individual
in US dollars (World Bank, 1997), ratio of exports of fuels and metals to
total merchandise exports (World Development Indicators), and log of
per-capita rent from energy, minerals, and forestry (World Development
Indicators)
￿ Institutional quality: the main reference variable is 1 minus the ratio of
currency in circulation to M2. This is constructed following the deifnition
in Clague et al. (1999) and using data in the Internaitonal Financial
Statistics of the IMF. For the sensitivity analysis, the index of quality of
the legal environment provided by the Economic Freedom of the World is
used.
￿ Ethnic fragmentation: probability that two randomly selected individuals
do not belong to the same ethnic group (La Porta et al. 1999)
￿ Latitude: countr￿ s latitude, measured at the capital city (La Porta et al.
1999)
￿ Legal origin: dummy variables taking value 1 if the countr￿ s legal system
originates from the UK common law, the French civil code, the German
commercial code, the Scandinavian commercial code, or the Socialist legal
framework (La Porta et al. 1999)
￿ Settler￿ s mortality: mortality rate of European settlers (Acemoglu et al.
2001)
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18Tables
Table 1: Single equation estimates
I II III IV V
Inequality Inequality Inequality Human dev. Human dev.
Constant 63.094*** 72.898*** 72.121*** -6.827*** -6.145
Natural resources 0.756** 0.004 0.392*** .. -0.068***
Institutional quality -5.092** -5.005** -1.764 0.139 0.124
Ethnic fragment. -9.746** -11.971*** -12.505** ..
Per-capita GDP -0.545 -1.351 -3.609 0.985*** 0.988***
Inequality .. .. .. -0.018*** -0.025**
Latitude .. .. .. -1.387*** -1.413*
Settler￿ s mortality .. .. .. 0.001 0.001
N.Obs 147 156 150 139 134
J-statistic 10.47 20.89 11.03 1.89 4.17
Notes: Estimation is by 2SLS. Instrumented variables are institutional quality and
per-capita GDP in all columns plus natural resources in column III and inequality in
columns IV and V. In columns I and II the excluded instruments are: latitude, settler￿ s
mortality, regional dummies, and legal origin dummies. In column III the excluded
instruments are as in columns I and II plus the constitutional variables for type of
regime and type of electoral rule. In column IV and V excluded instruments are:
ethnic fragmentation, regional dummies and legal origin dummies. The J-statistic is
the statistic of the test of overidentifying restrictions. The associated p-value is always
smaller than 0.1, implying that the null hypothesis that overidentfying restrictions
are valid cannot be rejected. *, **, *** denote statistical signi￿cance of estimated
coe¢ cients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% con￿dence level repsectively.
19Table 2: System estimates
I II III IV V
Inequality Human dev. Inequality Human dev Inst. quality
constant 53.314 -6.496** 56.331*** -6.593*** -3.967***
natural resources 0.721** -0.075*** 0.747** -0.076*** -0.075***
Institutional quality -8.876*** 0.246* -8.728*** 0.269** ..
Ethnic fragment. -11.581*** .. -12.667*** .. ..
per-capita GDP 2.415 1.011*** 2.046 1.016*** 0.873***
Inequality .. -0.027*** .. -0.027*** ..
Latitude .. -1.726** .. -1.8** 0.882*
settler￿ s mortality .. 0.001 .. 0.001 0.001
Legal origin UK .. .. .. .. 1.021***
N. Obs 291 653
J-statistic 14.82 7.23
Notes: Estimation is by GMM. Instrumented variables are institutional quality
and per-capita GDP. Excluded instruments are: latitude, settler￿ s mortality, regional
dummies, and legal origin dummies (with the exception of dummy for UK legal origin
in columns II, IV, and V). The J-statistic is the statistic of the test of overidentifying
restrictions. The associated p-value is always smaller than 0.1, implying that the
null hypothesis that overidentfying restrictions are valid cannot be rejected. *, **,
*** denote statistical signi￿cance of estimated coe¢ cients at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
con￿dence level repsectively.
20Table 3: Goodness of ￿t of ￿rst stage regression in 2SLS estimation
R2 Partial R2 F-stat Shea R2
Column I
Institutional quality 0.26 0.19 4.66*** 0.21
Per-capita GDP 0.58 0.34 10.53*** 0.38
Column II
Institutional quality 0.26 0.19 4.91*** 0.18
Per-capita GDP 0.53 0.38 12.95*** 0.37
Column III
Institutional quality 0.25 0.21 4.01*** 0.19
Per-capita GDP 0.49 0.36 8.54*** 0.36
Natural resources 0.15 0.15 2.72*** 0.13
Column IV
Institutional quality 0.22 0.11 3.35*** 0.13
Per-capita GDP 0.47 0.26 9.40*** 0.37
Inequality 0.43 0.36 14.54*** 0.35
Column V
Institutional quality 0.24 0.10 2.81*** 0.13
Per-capita GDP 0.57 0.31 11.09*** 0.42
Inequality 0.46 0.37 14.89*** 0.40
21